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FOREWORD 
Ko Ngati Kuri; Te Aupouri me Te Rarawa oku lwi. 
Ko Matatua te Waka. 
Ko Karirikura te Moana. 
Ko Whangatauatia te Maunga. 
Ko Te OhakT te Marae. 
Ko Emily Murupaenga raua ko Ha,moana Ngauma oku Tupuna . 
Ngati Kurr, Te Aupoun and Te Rarawa are my Tribes. 
The Great Voyaging Canoe (that brought my Ancestors here) is Matatua. 
Karirikura is the Ocean; 
Whangatauatia is the Mountain; 
Te OhakT is the Ancestral Meetmg House, 
Emily Murupaenga and Haimoana Ngauma are my Grandparents. 
I chose to begin my research paper with these words for a number of reasons, 
which I felt were important. Firstly, the words establish my Maori ethnicity. 
Therefore, my opinions and insights in this paper are drawn from my experiences 
as a Maori , as opposed to opinions and insights of a non-Maori writing about 
things 'Maori ' This is not to say that non-Maori views and insights about Maori 
things are valueless ( or vice-versa) - every viewpoint adds value to the dialogue 
on Maori issues. But that I am Maori establishes a context within which the views 
in this paper can be considered. My background might also be a consideration to 
factor in when comparing my views against others' . 
Secondly, the views communicated here will be my own. I am not an expert on 
Maori values and beliefs , nor do I profess to be. I am merely one individual Maori 
presenting her thoughts on a particular issue. Similarly, my words do not 
represent the "definitive Maori view'' : on the contrary, I doubt that there is such a 
thing. lwi, hapu (sub-tribes) , whanau (families) and Maori individuals all have 
different aspirations, goals, values and beliefs. This is not to say that to talk 
about issues for "Maori" , their beliefs, traditions and so on is a worthless exercise. 
While the indigenous people of Aotearoa are made up of distinct nations and 
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each societal group's perspective and history is unique, it can still be said that 
there are fundamental similarities with regard to our world view and core values 
which we all share. 
• • INTRODUCTION 
The term "intellectual property" refers to the products of one's intellectual efforts. 
' 
It also implies a need, if not the existence of, some form of product protection from 
those who would , without right , benefit from the use or otherwise of that product. 
It is a concept which is widely known in market-driven societies, i.e. societies 
whose existence and growth is based primarily in the production and consumption 
of goods and services by its members, and where the value of things in the 
natural world 1s determined primarily by commercial considerations and market 
forces such as supply and demand. 
A fundamental tenet of intellectual property law is that individuals are entitled to 
the fruits of their labour, to the extent that they are accorded exclusive 
"ownership" rights over the products of their efforts.1 This includes the right to 
protection of their intellectual property from unauthorised reproduction, application 
and sale, and the right to transfer ownership fully (or in part) to others. 
However, the market notion of intellectual property and its protection is not a 
universal concept, and the degree to which intellectual property protection has 
been a matter of concern and contention, particularly for indigenous peoples, has 
varied. On the one hand, communities world-wide have developed their own 
ways of relating to their environment, accessible resources and knowledge, and 
similarly there are just as many varieties of means of protection. The fact that 
certain indigenous peoples have remained relatively isolated from the rest of the 
world has enabled them to maintain their cultural practices and traditions and to 
safeguard their knowledge in accordance with those practices and traditions as 
they have done over the generations. As they have not been exposed to market-
driven society, they have been able to subsist in an environment free of the 
threats to their resources and knowledge such as inappropriate use and 
exploitation. 
1 With certain exceptions, for example, employers generally have ownership rights over th~ 
products of their employees' labour. 
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On the other hand, many other indigenous peoples have becom
e increasingly 
aware of intellectual property issues. This has resulted from th
eir community's 
exposure to the market society via contact with 'bioprospectors
' and 'bio-pirates', 
and subsequently in the introduction of threats to their knowled
ge which they are 
unequipped to defend against (should they be fortunate enoug
h to recognise 
them). 
As a complicating factor, intellectual property protection has al
so assumed 
increasing prominence as technological advances have expan
ded the ways in 
which ideas can be recorded , accessed, distributed, analysed 
and utilised. In 
addition, states, multinational companies and other non-govern
mental 
organisations have come to realise the market value of the kno
wledge and 
resources of indigenous peoples. This is related to the onslau
ght of 
'globalisation' and the accompanying international agreements
 such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the Agre
ement on trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) which 
have also 
facilitated (and, in some minds, provided justification for) what 
indigenous peoples 
have come to perceive as the new era of colonisation and plun
der. GA TI is an 
international agreement which seeks to reduce the barriers to 
international trade 
and actively encourage liberalisation of world trade. New Zeal
and became a 
member of the GATT on 30 July 1948. and several rounds of n
egotiation have 
taken place since then among its member states. The most re
cent (and arguably 
the most comprehensive) "Uruguay" round of negotiations was
 undertaken from 
1986 to 1994. TRIPS, as the name suggests, relates specifica
lly to intellectual 
property and international trading practices. Of particular conc
ern to indigenous 
peoples is how TRIPS operates to loosen patentability criteria 
(i.e. exposing more 
life forms to the possibility of being patented). Together, these
 agreements, and 
others like them, have been recognised by indigenous peoples
 as threatening to 
the protection of their knowledge and resources. The primary 
criticism is that 
agreements such as these reduce the power of governments to
 "regulate 
international trade" while at the same time increasing the abilit
y of international 
corporations and companies to exploit the resources of membe
r states (and the 
indigenous peoples of such member states) . 
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The extent to which indigenous peoples knowledge has been inappropriately 
used, exploited and expropriated as a result of these factors has been enormous. 
But the effects of this expropriation and so on are not merely confined to 
indigenous knowledge. Firstly, a community's culture is defined and identified by 
its language and the body of values, beliefs, stories, songs, customs and 
practices: 1n short, its knowledge Any effect on that knowledge (be it through 
inappropriate use. exploitation or expropriation) will have a corresponding effect 
on the health and well-being of the culture of the indigenous community and 
ultimately on the indigenous peoples themselves. The mere act, for example, of 
altering traditional stories in any way for distribution (perhaps to make them more 
suitable for 'foreign' audiences) re-defines the culture of the indigenous 
community where the stones originated from 
Secondly, the negative effects on indigenous knowledge are equally significant in 
terms of the self determination of indigenous peoples. For how can indigenous 
communities exercise their rights to use and protect their knowledge and fully 
express their culture if, for example, aspects of that knowledge has been 
expropriated by others? Thirdly the impacts on indigenous knowledge have 
implications for those communities who also desire to participate in the market 
economy and benefit commercially from that knowledge. 
The harmful effects to indigenous kncwledge. and the wider ramifications for 
indigenous peoples' culture, self determination and ability to benefit commercially 
from that knowledge, have increased the drive from indigenous communities, 
including Maori, to seek effective and appropriate protection of their knowledge. 
In the scramble to protect their knowledge, some indigenous peoples have, in ad 
hoe style, turned to the already established intellectual property protection 
mechanisms developed by market societies, only to discover that those 
mechanisms were ineffective in providing the protection they desired. Moreover, 
these mechanisms often played a significant role in the further inappropriate 
exploitation of their knowledge. The benefits for indigenous peoples who have, or 
have access to, a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of intellectual 
property law are not necessarily much greater. While more familiar with the 
protection mechanisms available. they have found those mechanisms to be 
5 
• • • 
inadequate. Indigenous peoples have consequently pressured states at both 
national and international fora to recognise and acknowledge their plight, and to 
work together to develop protection mechanisms which meet their interests . 
What I hope to achieve in this paper is to expand the current dialogue as to why 
the market-driven regime of knowledge protection - i.e. intellectual property law -
fails to adequately protect indigenous peoples' knowledge. I will outline the 
philosophy upon which the market notion of property is based drawing on the 
theories of Grotius. Pufendori and Locke. I will then establish the relationship 
between Grotius ', Pufendori's and Locke's philosophies and intellectual property 
law theory. This will be followed by a discussion of the traditional Maori worldview 
and the relat1onsh1p that Maori traditionally had with things in nature, and a 
comparison of that relat1onsh1p with how market society relates to things in nature 
as 'property' This will provide a basis for identifying the areas in which 
intellectual property laws are inadequate in terms of meeting Maori interests 
concerning the protection of the ir knowledge (be it traditional or contemporary). 
The writer also argues that indigenous peoples generally share many of the 
concerns that Maori have with regard to of intellectual property law and the 
inadequacy of the protections offered under that regime for indigenous 
knowledge. 
Finally, while many cultural barriers exist for indigenous peoples in relation to 
knowledge use and protection, the writer will show that there are nonetheless 
some interests common to both western and indigenous peoples. These interests 
could be used as a basis for the development of new and enlightened attitudes 
and models for the appropriate use of indigenous knowledge and protection. 
The subject matter of this paper requires a measure of generalisation of the 
traditions, cultures, practices and values of different peoples - each of whom as a 
distinct communities contribute to the diversity of our planet. However, a more 
detailed discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. It is hoped, nonetheless, 
that the writer's views and conclusions will add value to the ever increasing 
commentary and dialogue on this subject. 
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PRACTICAL EXAMPLES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 'MIS'-USE 
The issue of indigenous knowledge protection can sometimes seem to 
problematic and complex as to appear overwhelming. For many, merely trying to 
visualise practical examples where issues of indigenous knowledge protection (or, 
rather, the lack of it) may arise 1s difficult. For this reason , the writer has provided 
two concrete and everyday examples below. These will be used in this paper to 
help illustrate how intellectual property law is inadequate in protecting indigenous 
peoples' knowledge 
MACDONALD 1 S RESTAURANT 
MacDonalds has produced a paper 'mat' which is used in their restaurants nation-
wide to cover their food trays (a copy of the mat is included on the next page). On 
it are pictures of various New Zealand 'icons'· a Kiwi, a native tree, and a 'heitiki' 
(greenstone pendant personifying a human ancestor) . 
As a Maori I find the depiction of the heitik1 in that context inappropriate. The 
offence felt is not easy to express . however, it could be likened to having a picture 
of a person on a doormat and having all manner of people scuffing and wiping 
their dirty shoes all over that mat. It is not obvious from the image that it was 
based on or was a reproduction of an actual heitiki, but had this been the case the 
offence felt would be even greater. It would be the equivalent of having the 
picture of someone dear to me or someone whom I recognised as a person of 
great mana (prestige) on the doormat. 
Another factor about the inappropriate use of the heitiki in this example, however, 
is that in traditional Maori society there were many rules and protocols regarding 
aspects of everyday life: not only rules of common sense, but having to do with 
the tapu (sacredness) of certain things. And although I will not attempt to go into 
details here (as I do not have the expertise to do so, and it could easily take up a 
whole chapter of its own). suffice to say that from my upbringing and the 
community that I was raised in, I have always understood that there are certain 
'do's and 'don'ts concerning the preparation and eating of food . For instance, I 
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would never put my bone pendant ( or any other taonga [treasured thing] for that 
matter) on a kitchen bench or table, let alone have it be soiled with food. 
A hundred years ago, Maori may never have envisaged the way in which the 
image of a heitiki might be used as MacDonald's has done. However, the rules 
and protocols used by our Maori ancestors continue to hold relevance for Maori 
today. One may even go as far as to say that these rules are more pertinent now 
where society is dominated by market-driven culture and values, and where those 
things which hold special importance to Maori are threatened daily 
THE USE OF NAMES - THE "PARORE" INCIDENT 
During March in 1995, an interesting issue arose which sparked much debate 
among sporting New Zealanders and Maori , and for a brief time caught the 
attention of the local media. 
The issue centred around the correct pronunciation of the family name of the New 
Zealand cricket team wicket-keeper, Adam Parore. Sports commentators had up 
until that time pronounced his name by accentuating the 'o' and stretching out the 
'e' sound at the end, as in "Pah-roar-ee (as in "story"). 
A i='rnminent Maori figure, Sir Howard Morrison, challenged sports commentators 
to pronounce the surname correctly in accordance with Maori tradition (i .e. 
accentuating the 'a' in "Pa", 'rolling' the letter 'r', and having a short 'e' at the end, 
as in "egg"): Pa-ro-re. However, Mr Parore responded with a press statement 
asking the media to pronounce his name "correctly": Pah-roar-ee. 
It should be noted at this point that Sir Howard was prompted to raise the issue 
publicly because it was Maori Language Year. This combined with the fact that 
Mr Parore was the only Maori in the team, he considered that Adam had an 
obligation to pronounce the name properly, saying that "In Maori traditional terms 
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[pronouncing it wrongly is] tramping on the mana of a very dignified and well 
established name."2 
In this way, Sir Howard summed up the issue correctly: by mispronouncing his 
family name, Parore was insulting those who bore the name before him - his 
ancestors. That he did so intentionally only made his actions worse. 
However, unlike Sir Howard, this writer considers that a// Maori - not just famous 
ones - at a// times - not Just in the year of Maori Language - have a duty to 
pronounce their own family name correctly. The reason is, in my view, that as 
Maori our family names are ours individually in the sense that we bear them or are 
associated with them and they provide us with our sense of identity. However at 
the same time it cannot be said that we 'own' the name. Firstly, others also hold 
that name or are associated with it. In this sense, the name 'belongs' to all those 
people collectively - no one person can lay exclusive claim to it. But secondly 
(and perhaps more significantly) , in terms of what a "name" is and what it 
represents , it is not appropriate from a traditional Maori view to speak of 
ownership of a name at all : a name is something that has been passed down from 
our ancestors, and carries with it their reflections , their prestige. Possibly a more 
appropriate way to describe the relationship would be to say that we 'belong' to 
the name. I would not, therefore . be so arrogant as to say I owned my family 
name, let alone declare that I had the right to trample its mana by intentionally 
altering it in any way . 
2 "Parore sticks with pronounciation" The Dominion , Wellington. New Zealand , 25 March 1995. 
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THE ORIGINS OF 'PROPERTY' 
Before embarking on an evaluation of the compatibility of intellectual property law 
with indigenous concepts of knowledge use and protection, it is best to look at 
how both western and indigenous societies relate to resources. In terms of 
Western societies, I will attempt to provide an overview of the origins of the notion 
of 'property' by examining some of the pertinent influences on the jurisprudence of 
Western property law generally Grot1us Pufendorf and Locke. 
This is followed by a review of the origins of intellectual property law, specifically 
patenting and copyright. Together, these discussions will supply the basis for 
contrasting and comparing western property law with the ways in which 
indigenous peoples relate to their knowledge 
'NATURAL LAW' - PROPERTY' AS A NATURAL EXTENSION OF 'COMMON OWNERSHIP' 
Fundamentally, the concept of property law 1s grounded in "natural law". As a 
concept, it has as many different meanings as there are philosophers who have 
written on the subject. Nonetheless, a common characteristic of natural law for 
philosophers such as Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and John Locke, appears 
to be that natural law is a set of norms that evolved over time as a result of the 
sociableness' of human beings, combined with the each individual 's desire for 
self-preservation. 
Grotius saw "natural law" as innate ideas3 which existed independent of the divine 
will. He posited that, although God gave 'primitive'4 mankind the earth, the 
practice of private property was "a natural response to circumstances generated"5 
as humans abandoned their primitive state: 6 
3 S Buckle Natural Law and the Theory of Property: Grotius to Hume (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1991)64. 
4 Buckle, 37. 
5 Above n 4, 43 . 
6 Above n 4, 35. 
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Soon after the creation of the world ... God conferred upon the human race a 
general right over things of a lower nature. 'All things ... were the common and 
undivided possession of all men, as if all possessed a common inheritance' . In 
consequence , each man could at once take whatever he wished for his own needs, 
and could consume whatever was capable of being consumed. The enjoyment of 
this universal right then served the purpose of private ownership; for whatever each 
had thus taken for his own needs another could not take from him accept by an 
unjust act. 
COMMON 'USE R IGHTS' 
Grotius explained that, at this stage mankind lived in a simple state of 'moral 
purity', each taking from nature only that which they needed to survive. In this 
sense, humans had only 'use-rights' 1n the resources of the earth. No-one owned 
anything, no-one held 'property' 1n the strict or 'positive' sense. In Pufendorf s 
words, this created a kind of 'negative' community. To illustrate, Buckle gives the 
following analogy of guests invited to a buffet:7 
The food ... is for the guests , but no particular item is for any particular guest. 
... Rather, the food is just there for the taking ... provided what is taken has not 
already been claimed by someone else . and provided the taking itself involves no 
violence or injury . 
Moreover, while property did not exist in individuals in the positive sense, "there 
[was] nevertheless 'indefinite' or 'potential ' property". 8 Consequently:9 
Just as the original property in things in the natural state is only 'potential ' property, 
so the original right to use things in that state is no more than a 'potential' or 
'indefinite' right: 'God allowed man to turn the earth, its products, and its creatures, 
to his own use and convenience , that is, he gave men an indefinite right to them.' 
So where did the shift from 'indefinite use rights of mankind collectively' to 
'positive ownership rights of individuals' occur? For Grotius and Pufendorf, 
7 Above n 4, 95-96. 
8 Above n 4, 78. 
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'proprietorship' evolved as human interaction dictated. Grotius theorised that, 
over time, humans abandoned their state of moral purity and became corrupted, 
rivalrous and ambitious. This eventually led to a gradual displacement of sharing 
of the 'common' with a division of that common into "territories of first, nations, and 
secondly, households." 10 Private ownership was the further and final stage of this 
"sequence of divisions or agreements ··11 In Pufendorf's words, property was 
necessary "in order to avoid quarrels and preserve peace".12 
LOCKE 1S RELIANCE ON THE M IXING OF "L ABOUR" 
Grot1us, Pufendorf and other philosophers were respons ible for establishing a 
general theory on the progression of the things in nature from state of 'belonging' 
to mankind in common to a state of 'private property ownership' tn individuals. 
However, it was Locke's theory which came closer to identifying specifically at 
what point that shift from the common to the private occurred. And it 1s Locke's 
ideas which have consequently had the most significant influence on modern 
notions of property, and hence property law in market societies today. 
Locke agreed with Grotius and Pufendorf that the state which preceded private 
ownership was a state where things were held 'in common' by all to be used for 
their preservation and subsistence 13 However, he distinguished that, while things 
of Nature belonged to mankind, it made no sense to speak of an person 
'belonging' to anyone other than himself [sic] . Similarly, an individual 's energy -
or labour - could also belong only to that particular person. He then reasoned that 
whatever (of the things in nature held 'in common') an individual affected with her 
labour must necessarily become hers to claim as property:14 
Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man 
has a "property" in his own "person." This nobody has any right to but himself. The 
9 Above n 4, 79. 
10 Above n 4, 40. 
11 Above n 4, 41 . 
12 Above n 4, 98. 
13 J Locke Of Civil Government - Two Treatises (J M Dent & Sons Limited, London 1924) 129. 
14 Above n 13, 130. 
12 
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"labour" of his body and the "work" of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it 
in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined to it something that is his own, and 
thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state 
Nature placed it in , it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the 
common right of other men. For this "labour" being the unquestionable property of 
the labourer, no man but he can have a nght to what that is once joined to, at least 
where there is enough , and as good left 1n common for others. 
A further aspect of Locke's 'labour' theory strongly influences modern day 
property law. The first was founded 1n his view that mankind owed obedience to 
God and should therefore live consistently with God's design. In terms of God's 
intent in gifting the world to mankind, Locke's view was that: 15 
God and his reason commanded [all mankind] to subdue the earth - i.e., improve 1t 
for the benefit of life ... but since He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest 
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He 
meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of 
the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not to the fancy or 
covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious . 
Therefore, Locke seemed to be endorsing the view (implicitly if not explicitly) that 
labour, inasmuch as it furthered activities undertaken in accordance with "the 
purposes of God", morally entitled those who laboured to claim the thing affected 
as their property. His theory on mankind's duty to engage in activity according to 
God's purpose also necessarily denotes that whatever was left 'unmixed' with 
labour was to leave it available for another's improvement. This perhaps provides 
insights as to the origins of the legal concept of "Terra Nullius" (or, literally 
translated: "Land that has no value") . This term was often used in the era of 
colonisation in reference to lands that were not cultivated or farmed or appeared 
not to be used for any obvious purpose, and were therefore deemed by explorers 
to be lands that were legitimately available for claim by those who "discovered" 
them. 
15 Above n 13, 132-133 
13 
Therefore, labour was of primary importance to Locke's theory of how things in 
Nature transferred from being held in common to private ownership. In fact, it was 
Locke who believed that: 16 
of the products of the earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects of 
labour ... when anyone hath computed, he will then see how much labour makes the 
far greatest part of the value of things we enJoy in this world; ... It 1s labour, .. . which 
puts the greatest part of value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth 
anything 
This, then, was Locke's reasoning: firstly that a person's labour being her own, 
that which was mixed with her labour must become hers. This premise was 
complemented by his cons1derat1on of labour as "a rationa l (or purposefu l), value-
creating activity" 17 
THE NEED FOR A GREEMENT 
While private property may have arisen out of a need to keep the peace or 
because it was justified by the use of one's labour, the act of carving out a thing 
held in common and bel iev ing or declaring it to be private property did not in itself 
guarantee recognit ion of that thing as private property. Acceptance or agreement 
had to exist 1n the community about the creation of private property, and whether 
ownership rights would be respected. In other words, according to Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Locke, use-rights evolved into private ownership either tacitly (by 
acceptance) or explicitly (by agreement). Again, using his 'buffet' example, 
Buckley illustrates th is po int: 18 
Successful removal [of food) must be publicly recognizable .. . At a banquet, 
... placing food on a plate , and drink in a glass, are usually recognised as acts of 
removal. Whether the act is successful just because of the act itself, or because of 
the acceptance of the act as appropriate, is another matter. On the former 
understanding , ... [s)uccessful removal could ... be described as being due to the 
16 Above n 13, 136-137. 
17 Above n 4, 151 . 
18 Above n 4, 96 . 
14 
exercise of labour. On the latter understanding, the act is successful because it is 
seen to be an appropriate solution to the problem, and so is not interfered with . 
SUMMARY 
The predominant feature of property law theory as espoused by Grotius, 
Pufendorf and Locke is the need for ·self-preservation' and the rights of the 
individual to this end. The theory also reflects the notion that the earth was 
'given' to mankind for their use. which somehow places humans in a position 
'divorced' from their environment. 
In a general sense, property evolved from the gradual development of the 
common 'use right' to individual 'ownership'. This development was depicted as a 
'natural' result of the evolution of human societies. More specifically, Locke 
theorised that the point at which things held in common became private property 
was when individuals mixed their labour with those things. However, acceptance 
or agreement within the community was also required to maintain the system of 
propri etorsh Ip. 
15 
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THE ORIGINS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
The preceding discusses some of the main characteristics of property law theory 
generally. The following section provides an overview of the basis for intellectual 
property law specifically. Harking back to Grotius', Pufendorf's and Locke's 
theories, intellectual property law may be seen merely as a system of codification 
of the market society's agreement about the circumstances which justify private 
ownership of things previously held '1n common'. Here we can also see how 
intellectual property law 1s influenced particularly by Locke's views on the pre-
eminence of human labour in Justifying ownership of knowledge. 
Economic Incentive 
Hammond says that "[t]he thrust of intellectual property law is today usually expressed 
in economic terms" 19 The Ministry of Commerce states:20 
The essence of intellectual property rights is the conferral or recognition of an 
exclusive right to exploit the owner's invention, literary or artistic work, design or 
trade mark as an incentive to encourage ongoing innovation and investment. 
Intellectual property law therefore reflects Grotius', Pufendorf's and particularly 
Locke's views about the paramount importance of utilising and improving things in 
the natural world for the benefit of mankind. Innovation and the development and 
implementation of new ideas ( or old ones for that matter) is important to society to 
"promote economic advance [sic] and consumer welfare" .21 
However, for most people, it is the anticipation or expectation of receiving some 
benefit at the end of the process of developing a product which encourages them 
to invest time and resources into creating it. For example, no-one would write 
books for a living if people could obtain copies of their works for free. Intellectual 
19 G Hammond "The Legal Protection of Ideas" (1991) 29 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 93, 94. 
20 Ministry of Commerce Review of Industrial Property Rights, Patents, Trade Marks and Designs: 
Possible Options for Reform (Competition Policy and Business Law Sivision, Ministry of 
Commerce, Wellington) 223 
211bid .. 
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property rights therefore provide the right-holder exclusivity over her work so that 
she might "capture the full or at least fuller, benefits of those commodities."22 
Identifying the Source of the Knowledge 
Locke's theory that individuals are entitled to the fruits of their labour forms one of 
the cornerstones of intellectual property law Intellectual property law offers 
protection to individuals. or ind1v1duals Jointly, of knowledge where that individual 
or 1ndiv1duals can establish that they were the creator of that knowledge and 
therefore entitled to claim ownership of 1t For example, section 7 of the Patents 
Act 1953 states that: 
( 1) An application for a patent for an invention may be made by any of the 
following persons . that 1s to say· 
(a) By any person claiming to be the true and first inventor of the invention: 
(b) By any person being the assignee of the person claiming to be the true 
and first inventor in respect of the right to make such an application ,--
and may be made by that person either alone or jointly with any other person . 
In relation to copyright, the source of the creation (i .e. the author) is ordinarily the 
person or persons who were responsible for "first reducing the work to writing or 
some other material form ."23 
Originality/ Novelty/ Innovative Requirement 
The individual or individuals applying for protection under intellectual property law 
must demonstrate that their work is more than a mere 'discovery' . Patents, for 
example provide protection for "inventions" , which implies an element of 
innovation or ingenuity. In addition, Cornish distinguishes discovery and 
invention in this way:24 
22 Above n 19. 
23 Brown and Grant The Law of Intellectual Property in New Zealand (Wellington, Butterworths 
1989) 272. 
24 WR Cornish Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights (2 ed , 
Sweet and Maxwell , London , 1989) 139 
17 
[D]iscovery is the unearthing of causes, properties or phenomena already existing 
in nature; invention is the application of such knowledge to the satisfaction of social 
needs 
Section 14( 1) of the Copyright Act 1994 provides that copyright subsists only in 
original creations. Again , this criteria reflects Grotius', Pufendorf's and Locke's 
concept that there naturally exists some 'common' pool of resources, and to 
separate out something from that common requires an individual (according to 
Locke) to mix her labour with it - in this instance, the mixing of labour needs to be 
to a degree which creates an original work. 
Limited Duration of Protection 
With the exclusivity of ownership comes the risk that the owner could limit 
society's access to resources over which the right is held. This would negate the 
benefits to society of establishing incentives for individuals to be creative in the 
first place. Intellectual property law therefore also attempts to maintain "the 
balance between individual and social rights."25 It does this principally by offering 
temporary protection to intellectual property (for example, section 22 of the 
Copyright Act 1994 states that copyright in a literary, dramatic, musical , or artistic 
work expires at the end of the period of 50 years from the end of the calendar 
year in which the author dies) . 
25 Malcolm McNeil! A Critique of GATT:TRIPS - A report prepared for the Waitangi Tribunal for 
the Hearing of the Treaty of Waitangi Flora and Fauna Claim (WAI 262) (2 February 1997) 32. 
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THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF 'INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY' 
PROTECTION FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
Having established the theoretical framework for, and some of the main 
characteristics of, intellectual property law, the writer will now explore the main 
aspects of the traditional Maori world-view In particular, traditional Maori views of 
their place in the world and the relationship they hold with their environment will 
form the basis for a comparison with the market notion of property (i. e. as based 
on Grotius', Pufendorf's and Locke's views) and hence the effectiveness of 
intellectual property law protections relating to Maori knowledge. The writer will 
show that the market intellectual property regime reveals a markedly different 
world view to indigenous peoples' about the relationship that individuals and 
communities have with things in the natural world; a world view that is inadequate 
in terms of acknowledging indigenous peoples' values and beliefs. 
As many facets of the traditional Maori world-view hold similarities with other 
indigenous peoples, it is argued that these inadequacies are also relevant for 
indigenous communities generally. 
'PROPERTY' - COMPARISON WITH THE MAORI WORLD VIEW 
THE MAORI "COSMOGONY" 
Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic that indigenous peoples share is the 
extent to which they value and respect all things in the universe, both tangible and 
intangible. 
For Maori , this value and respect stems from the belief that we, and all the 
elements and contents of the universe, share the same origins in creation. 
Among Maori , there are a number of different accounts of how the universe came 
to be. Sometimes it is described as a birth-like process, other times images of the 
growth of a tree are used. Yet another version, particularly relevant here, 
19 
describes it "as a searching , an unfolding of consciousness and thought" 26 which 
began with the uttering of a single word , increasing to energy, memory and 
wisdom. They all provide an account of where life began: 
Te Kore 
(the realm of "chaos"/ "nothingness"/ "potential being") 
lo 
(The Supreme Being who dwelt in Te Kore) 
Te Hirihiri 
(pure energy) 
Te Po 
(the night) 
Te Ao Marama 
(the full light of day) 
Te Kowhao 
(the single being/ ancestor created by lo) 
Then, from the creation of the universe came the creation of the world and 
everything in it, beginning with the sky, the earth, and their many children - all 
supernatural beings: 
Te Kowhao 
Ranginui e tu iho nei --------------- ---------------- Papatuanuku 
(the "sky father") (the "earth mother") 
26 MP Shirres Te Tangata - the Human Person (Accent Publications, Auckland, 1997) 23. 
Tane mahuta 
(God of the 
Forests) 
Tangaroa 
(God of the Sea) 
Tawhirimatea 
(God of the 
Winds / Weather) 
Tumatauenga Rongomatane ... 
(God of Warfare) (God of 
Agriculture) 
From the earth of Papatuanuku, Tane mahuta created Hineahuone, the "earth 
maiden": and together according to traditional Maori belief, they brought forth 
humanity He was also responsib le for creating all things in the forests - trees, 
plants, b1rdlife , etc. 
As a result, for traditional Maori , all things - inanimate objects, plants, animals and 
humans - share a common ancestry through Rangi and Papa, back to the very 
origins of the universe Maori are consequently inextricably connected to all that 
surrounds us. This is perhaps best described by Dr M Roberts , Dell Wihongi and 
others, Maori Claimants for the Flora and Fauna (WAI 262) claim to the Waitangi 
Tribunal :27 
... everything in the Universe, inanimate and animate, has its own whakapapa or 
genealogy, and all are ultimately linked via the gods to Rang1 and Papa . ... "The bond 
this creates between humans and the rest of the physical world 1s both immutable and 
unseverable" (Tomas. 1994). Every Maori shares this descent from gods, goddesses, 
guardians and superhumans. 
The whakapapa or genealogy of the cosmos according to Maori tradition 
reinforces the relationship between humans, the gods, the ultimate creator and 
the universe. More than being made merely in the image of our creator, humans 
are reminded that they carry the wairua (life force/ spirit) , mana (prestige) , ihi 
(power) and wehi (awesomeness) of our god ancestors:28 
27 Dr DV Williams Matauranga Maori and Taonga - The Nature and Extent of Treaty Rights held 
by lwi and Hapu in Indigenous Flora and Fauna, Cultural Heritage Objects, Valued Traditional 
Knowledge (A report prepared under a commission from Gina Rud land of Wellington, Solicitor to 
the Wai 262 Claimants as authorised by a Direction from the Waitangi Tribunal dated 3 May 1996, 
January 1997) 91 . 
28 Above n 27 , 91 . 
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.. . as Hohepa (1994) remarks , "these multi-god/goddess guardians and 
responsibilities, these ties with humans who have the divine spark of descent from 
gods, are not compatible with .. . the Christian belief of an independent God who has 
no genealogical connection , and who exists in splendid isolation somewhere in 
heaven" 
The ramifications that this state of affairs has for traditional Maori are highly 
significant in terms of the relationship we have with our knowledge and the 
requirements for its protection . Numerous themes become evident which 
characterise how we value our indigenous knowledge. Some of these are 
discussed below. Again , it is argued that these hold much in common with other 
indigenous peoples' world-views 
THE RELATEDNESS OF ALL THINGS 
The most apparent effect of the Maori account of creation is that traditionally, all 
things are seen as being related . The importance of establishing and maintaining 
human 'relationships' is evident from the customs associated with speaking on the 
marae. For example, it is customary for visitors to announce their whakapapa 1n 
order to establish where they are from and, where possible, their genealogical 
links with their hosts. Even in more informal settings, when Maori individuals 
meet each other for the first time, the conversation usually begins with each 
enquiring as to where the other 1s from 
However, the Maori tradition is also characterised by the genealogical links its 
people have with all other things in the universe - both tangible and the intangible, 
animate and inanimate - and by the way in which these links are maintained. The 
Ministry of Research Science and Technology has stated that " ... matauranga 
Maori is a system which codifies knowledge according to its relatedness to 
environmental and life issues, rather than to what things are in themselves".
29 
This 'system' of knowledge codification is illustrated by the following example:3o 
29 See the Ministery's 1995 publication entitled "The Interface Between Matauranga Maori and 
Mainstream Science" referred to in Williams Matauranga Maori and Taonga 1997 14-15. 
30 Above n 27, 16. 
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An example of this in matauranga Maori would be the use of whakapapa to 
describe the different forms of stone and their groupings. Best describes the 
following classification (abridged)· 'From the tenth period of Chaos sprang Papa 
the Earth Mother already mentioned, and then appeared Papa-matua-te-lore (Papa 
the parentless) who mated with Rangi-a-Tamaku and had a firstborn Putoto, whose 
sister was Parawhenuamea (personified form of water) . Putoto took his own sister, 
Parawhenuamea, to wife , and she bore Rakahore, who mated with Hineuku (the 
Clay Maiden), who bore Tuamatua (all kinds of stones found on sea coasts ... ), from 
whom came gravel and the stone The younger brother of Tuamatua was 
Whatuaho (greywake. chert, etc}, next came Papakura (origin of volcanic stone, 
kauwhanga , whatukura . wa1apu .. kinds of stone) , then Tau1ra-karapa (greenstone 
of different kinds) ... 
Although Maori used names different to the equivalents that scientists use today, 
they nonetheless represent many of the same classifications of rock and soil , etc. 
Such "whakapapa" also reveals the Maori awareness of the relationships (literally) 
between , as in the case given above, the different rock and soil types and what 
geological forces create them. 
In addition, "whakapapa" personifies the inanimate and things in the natural world . 
This increases our re latedness to those things and strengthens the value of those 
things for individual Maori and the Maori community. Market-driven culture, on 
the other hand, does the exact opposite. everyth ing is objectified and 
depersonalised. Something's value is a function of the extent to which it can 
satisfy human's wants , needs and desires - a mere means to that end. For 
example, Aroha Mead writes :31 
Western science goes to great lengths to de-humanise the humanness or life-force 
of human genes; hence, terms such as "specimens," "materials," "properties," and 
"collections" ... It is contrary to indigenous tradition to "objectify" a gene or human 
organs as these are living and sacred manifestations of the ancestors ... 
The use of whakapapa as a means of conceptualising information therefore has at 
least a dual purpose. Firstly, it reinforces the relationships between everything in 
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the world and the universe - including the direct links which humans have with our 
environment. Secondly, whakapapa preserves practical and traditional 
information from generation to generation 
Consequently, the direct and strong relat1onsh1p between Maori and our 
environment dominates our perception of the world , our role in it, and forms the 
basis of our tikanga (prescriptive rules) for the use of resources in the 
environment:32 
.. . materials are [therefore] available for use . but must never be regarded as mere means ... 
Maori traditions give man a degree of dominance over nature ... But man is also km to the 
rest of nature .. " 
The relationship described above which Maori traditionally had with physical and 
tangible objects is the same for intangible resources - i.e. our collective 
indigenous knowledge . 
Comment 
The traditional Maori view that we are connected genealogically with our planet 
and its resources contrasts with the view of the philosophers (Grot1us, Pufendorf 
and Locke) which portrays humans as having been created independently of and 
divorced from their environment and unaffected by its degradation. 33 This, 
combined with the theory that the earth was 'given' to mankind to consume 
(according to Grotius) , or to subdue (according to Locke) , results in a lack of 
affinity with the earth and its resources which manifests in market-driven societies 
as objectification, commodification and commercialisation of things. 
Such objectification and commodificat1on is incompatible with traditional Maori 
views and practices, and in this writer's opinion prevent producers and consumers 
in market societies to perceive the inherent value that things have over and above 
31 Aroha Te Pareake Mead "Genealogy, Sacredness, and the Commodities Market" (1996) 20 
Cultural Survival 46. 
32 Above n 27 , 98-99. 
33 Horizon: Icon Earth (Channel One. Television New Zealand, 8.00am,31 July 1997). 
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the extent to which they can satisfy human wants and needs. It therefore impedes 
them from recognising and appreciating the harm that Maori feel is done to their 
indigenous knowledge, such as in the MacDonald's case given above. The 
following commentary about the Human Genome Diversity Project provides 
another example:34 
The HGDP has already begun dehumanising us by labelling us "Isolates of Historic 
interest" Once human beings are depersonalised, it is easier to go about destroying 
them or allowing them to be destroyed .. 
However, further analys is of Locke's view, for example, reveals more parallels 
with traditional Maori and indigenous world views than initially supposed. Locke 
did believe, in contrast to our traditional views, that Nature belonged to mankind. 
At the same time he acknowledged the reasonableness of "every man [having] a 
"property" in his own "person""35 or, in other words, the unreasonableness of 
including "people" 1n the pool of natural things that could appropriately be carved 
out of the 'collective ' and made private "property" Traditional Maori also held this 
belief, and we extended it to apply to all things in the natural world (such as plants 
and animals) . This was facilitated via our personification of things in the natural 
world , and the reason we did this was because of the relationship we perceived 
we had with those things , through whakapapa. Therefore, we maintained a view 
that it was unreasonable or unthinkable (all other things being equal) to consider 
humans as having 'property' over things 1n nature or over other humans. 
It should be noted here that traditional Maori did have a range of personal effects 
including such things as clothing, earrings, pendants, haircombs, etc. However, 
this writer argues that traditional Maori did not presume the authority (as of right 
and as some fundamental first principle or rule of nature) to exploit and improve 
things in nature for human use as Locke suggests of mankind. This way of 
traditional Maori thinking is illustrated in the following example: 36 
34 M Solomon Intellectual Property: Speech Notes for Institute for International Research 
Conference (Auckland , 24-25 February, 1997) . 
35 Ref. P10 - Locke's Reliance on the Mixing of "Labour" , above. 
36 Above n 27, 97 . 
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The most commonly used material in traditional Maori weaving is harakeke or flax . 
... today's Maori are related to harakeke and all the other plants: Tane is their 
common ancestor . ... On the other hand, as a descendent of the victorious Tu [the 
God of War, Tumatauenga], a Maori is able to make use of the descendants of 
Tane. Use is permitted , sanctioned by Tu's defeat of Tane, but it must be 
respectful use ... 
Furthermore, it was not uncommon for an individual to first acknowledge a 
resource before removing it from its natural state and explicitly seeking 
permission from the Gods for its use In some instances, this was achieved by 
karakia (prayer or incantation) or other ritual. 
THE INHERENT SACREDNESS/ INTEGRITY OF ALL THINGS 
As Margaret Mutu puts it37: 
... the most basic aspect of Maori culture which distinguishes it most sharply from 
that of Europeans is that it puts spiritual and communal matters ahead of material 
and individualistic needs . 
Veronica Jacobsen writes that "[indigenous] Spirituality and sacredness are 
interconnected with resources 1n ways which do not fit Western concepts."
38 This 
is reflected in the traditional Maori v.1or!d that tile process and products of creation 
all are sacred; they are all valuable in and of themselves. Their sacredness and 
value existed before humans, or their needs, wants and desires ever appeared on 
the scene, and will continue to do so after we are gone. Aroha Mead also states 
that:39 
Central to indigenous cultures is a profound respect and understanding of 
sacredness .... "Believing in the sanctity and integrity of life even in its smallest 
form ... All life forms should be treated in a way that respects their intrinsic value as 
37 Above n 27 , 12. 
38 Veronica Jacobsen What is the Best Mechanism To Recongnise and Protect the Claims of 
Indigenous Peoples to Plants and their Knowledge of the Use of Plants? - No. 9412, Working 
Papers in Economics (Department of Economics, The University of Waikato, Hamilton, 1994) 17. 
39 Above n 31 , 46 . 
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living generational manifestations of creation" (Treaty for a Life forms Patent-Free 
Pacific, 1995). .. . The call is the same -nature and living things, tangible and 
intangible, all are sacred [my emphasis added] . 
In one sense, to understand the concept of 'sacredness' for traditional Maori is 
simply to understand what it means to respect the things in nature as wondrous 
marvels of creation. Maori believe that everything has its own 'mauri ' ('energy' or 
'life force') "by which all things cohere in nature" 40 Given this, one can begin to 
comprehend the relat1onsh1p that Maori hold with our environment. Other 
indigenous peoples share similar experiences. Posey argues that41 : 
"Property" for indigenous people frequently has intangible, spiritual manifestations, and, 
although worthy of protection , can belong to no human being . Privatisation or 
commoditization of their resources 1s not only foreign but incomprehensible or even 
unthinkable . 
Comment 
This aspect of the traditional Maori world view does not seem to share any 
significant common ground with Grot,us'. Pufendorf's or Locke's theories of 
property. The focus of these philosophers' world views appeared to be that the 
world was given to mankind for our use and to alter as we see fit. Whether those 
resources had an inherent integrity which required that conditions of their use be 
defined and adhered to by potential users does not seem to be a significant 
matter for Grotius, Pufendorf or Locke They would , perhaps, see nothing wrong 
with Mr Parore's request (in the example given at page X above) that his name be 
pronounced Pah-roar-ree. In contrast, Maori appreciative of traditional views and 
values would understand how compliance with such a request would breach the 
sacredness and integrity of that name. 
From a traditional Maori perspective, intellectual property law fails to protect our 
knowledge in a fundamental way: for Maori and other indigenous communities our 
knowledge has an inherent value due to its integrity and sacredness. Its value is 
40 Above n 26 , 116. 
41 Above n 27 , 46 . 
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not derived solely or primarily from its economic utility; our traditional knowledge 
did not evolve as a result of 'economic incentive'. Yet the overriding objective of 
intellectual property law is to protect individual's rights to exploit their knowledge 
and receive the commercial benefits associated with that exploitation. Many 
Indigenous peoples do wish to take advantage of commercial opportunities and to 
share their knowledge with others - if it can be assured that such knowledge will 
be appropriately used and protected 
In addition , what protection intellectual property law does offer is only temporary. 
This will not suffice with regard to indigenous knowledge. The sacredness of 
knowledge is not bound temporally; the inherent integrity of knowledge does not 
wane after any amount of time, let alone a term prescribed by another culture. 
Intellectual property law does acknowledge that certain uses of intellectual 
property may be inappropriate. For example, section 17 (1) of the Patents Act 
1953 states: 
(1) If it appears to the Commissioner in the case of any application for a patent 
that the use of the invention in respect of which the application is made would 
be contrary to morality, the Commissioner may refuse the application . 
However, this writer asks, to what extent does the concept of morality (bound 
within the 'market' framework of intellectual property) incorporate or recognise 
indigenous values, rights , interests and concerns as opposed to the market-driven 
values, rights , interests and concerns? And what would be the outcome for 
indigenous peoples in the likely event that their values , etc, competed directly with 
market and economic considerations on issues of 'morality'? Would indigenous 
peoples succeed in their case? One can only speculate. 
However, there are many areas of intellectual property law which offer only strictly 
defined 'morality' provisions. For example, in terms of the Copyright Act 1994, 
section 94 ( 1 ) (a) states that: 
The author of a literary, dramatic, musical , or artistic work that is a copyright work 
has the right to be identified as the author of the work. 
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Taking the example of the use of the heitik1 image in the MacDonald's case, it 
would appear that had the MacDonald's 'mat' been copyrighted Maori would have 
no recourse under section 94(1 )(a) for v01c1ng or addressing their concerns about 
the inappropriate use of that image Even where recourse exists, however, given 
that the values and world-views of market society and indigenous peoples seem 
to differ on such fundamental levels, the possibilities that indigenous peoples 
would not be successful in arguing their case seem significant. 
CREATION AS AN ONGOING PROCESS 
Rev M Marsden has described the Maori world view in this way·42 
... the Maori perceived the universe as a "Process" .. . a world comprised of a series 
of interconnected realms separated by aeons of time from which there eventually 
emerged the natural world. This cosmic process is unified and bound together by 
spirit. 
This account of Maori cosmogony is supported by Dr M Roberts, Dell Wihongi 
and others , who note that ". .. the universe is hol1st1c and dynamic; there is within it 
[an] ongoing process of continuous creation and recreation ." 43 
This is in stark contrast to how western cultures relate to their environments 
which, in their view, are assumedly comprised of "indestructible atoms of solid 
matter and conforms to strict mechanical laws in an absolutely predictable 
manner". 44 In short, Maori and western views are polarised on this front: 45 
. .. The ease with which western scientists are able to deconstruct objects and then 
treat each component part as independent of its counterparts is not readily 
acceptable to the Maori mind .. .. the whole of nature exists in a delicate balance of 
life which ought not to be disrupted unnecessarily . .. . Transgenic research involving 
the introduction of human genes into non-human species [is] considered 
reprehensible and offensive by most Maori ... This reductionist mentality is reflected 
42 Above n 27 , 88 . 
43 Above n 27, 91 . 
44 Above n 27, 96 . 
45 Above n 27, 145-146. 
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in Pakeha 'laws' which divide up and apportion exclusive rights in objects to 
individuals . ... Even if an acceptable consent procedure is developed, there still 
remains the question as to how many and who has the right to give consent to 
research which could affect the wider collective. 
Comment 
The traditional Maori world-view that creation is ongoing reflects the difficulty that 
Maori also have in identifying the source of their indigenous knowledge. 
Intellectual property law is an acknowledgement of Locke's theories on the mixing 
of labour with things in the natural world , suggesting that it is a relatively simple 
task to identify the creator of things. But for much of traditional knowledge its 
author or "first creator" is not known Jacobson writes:46 
[Intellectual property rights] are designed to protect identifiable individual 
innovations, not communal knowledge Traditional knowledge is usually the result 
of the contributions of many people over a long period. Generally the identity of 
the originators is unknown, and if known is ancient. Although some individuals 
within a community, such as traditional healers, may have specialised knowledge, 
they do not have the right to sell that knowledge commercially . 
In other situations, authorship or creation 1s not attributed to natural persons: 47 
In Western societies , the creator of a new song is usually an individual who 
automatically becomes its owner .. In a traditional society, however, the "creator" 
may attribute "authorship" to a member of the spirit world. 
While the attribution of authorship in this indigenous sense is no less legitimate 
than that which occurs in a market society, this can be somewhat problematic for 
indigenous peoples who wish to gain access to intellectual property protections! 
While the inability to conform with intellectual property requirements (in terms of 
46 Above n 38, 17 . 
47 DA Posey and G Outfield Beyond Intellectual Property: Toward Traditional Resource Rights for 
Indigenous People and Local Communities (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, 
1996) 60. 
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identification of the creator) impedes access for Maori and other indigenous 
peoples to those protections, there 1s also another issue to address:48 
Although some individuals within a community, such as traditional healers, may 
have specialised knowledge. they do not have the right to sell that knowledge 
commercially . 
EMPHASIS ON 'PERMITTED USE' AND 'DUTIES' RATHER THAN 'OWNERSHIP RIGHTS' 
Another point to note regarding Maori knowledge is that our traditional system of 
values and beliefs did not allow for a sense of 'ownership' of resources 1n the 
market sense This has been an issue of some contention 1n the context of 1 t"eaty 
of Waitangi claims . 
Many Maori claim that they have suffered prejudice and loss as a result of Crown 
actions, policies and/ or omissions regarding resources which have been 
depleted, confiscated or otherwise detrimentally affected. In an attempt to 
establish the basis for such grievances, these claimants have provided evidence 
of 'rangatiratanga ' or 'control and authority· over resources . Often the Crown has 
attempted to undermine these claims by stating that the claimant's ancestors did 
not, in fact , have a concept of (market) 'ownership'. From this , the Crown reasons 
that the claimant's ancestors had no 'ownership' rights in regard to resources 
associated with the claim , and that the claimant therefore had no case against the 
Crown. 
However, in presenting their case 1n this manner, the Crown relies on the false 
assumption that there is , somewhere 'out there', only one 'correct' way in which 
people and communities relate to their environment, and that the system of 
'ownership' familiar to the Crown is the only system that holds any authority; that 
other cultural frameworks are unworthy of recognition. 
In employing such an argumentative line and relying on the mere assumption that 
the market society system of 'ownership' somehow applied universally, the Crown 
48 Above n 38 , 17. 
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risked creating an appearance of itself as arrogant and ethnocentric. It is obvious 
that the values and beliefs of indigenous peoples were different to those of the 
market world , as evidenced over the centuries by encounters between the two 
cultures . 
In the context of such Wa1tang1 Tribunal hearings, it could be argued Maon and 
the Crown present evidence about two different concepts· while the Crown speaks 
of 'ownership', Maori speak of 'rangatiratanga '. For traditional Maori (and indeed, 
for Maori today) rangatiratanga referred to a complex system whereby they were 
permitted to use resources primarily for survival purposes, and had corresponding 
duties as 'ka1tiaki ' or 'guardians' to maintain and protect these resources. For 
example, in the Ngai Tahu Sea Fisheries Report, the Waitangi Tribunal considers 
Crown evidence that the claimants did not "own" the sea and its resources:
49 
.. . At the same time, as Dr Morton and messrs Molloy and Anderson have pointed 
out, there is no evidence that Ngai Tahu claimed ownership of the creatures in the 
sea , be they whales or any other species . We do not find this surprising. Whales, 
like fish , were 1n Maori terms the children of Tangaroa , they were not owned as 
property . They were an essential part of the natural world , a resource made 
available to the tribe , through beaching or for smaller whales through capture. Nga1 
Tahu did not see themselves as owning whales , or any fish for that matter, as they 
swam freely in the sea . While the niana of the tribe was seen as extending over 
their taking and use, this did not imply ownership of the sea, or of sea mammals or 
fish , but it did reflect the exercise of rangat1ratanga over the resource . 
Another example is given of a greenstone tik1 which , over 30 years, was 
successively buried with the "ancestors" (presumably with the one who had worn 
or been affiliated with it) and then dug up to be worn by the living.
50 This 
illustrates the absence of a strict market sense of ownership, and the emphasis 
Maori placed on intergenerational links. 
Comment 
49 Chapter 3.9.21. 
50 TK Penniman (ed) Makereti: The Old-Time Maon (New Women 's Press, Auckland , 1986) 11 
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The distinction between the concepts of rangatiratanga and ownership of 
resources and knowledge seems to reside firstly in the fact that Maori historically 
did not focus on 'economic incentive' as the basis for their relationship with those 
resources and their knowledge. However, 1w1 and hapO did have a custom of 
trading and exchanging resources with other iwi and hapO (for example, food and 
raw materials) , so the commercial practices of the settlers and colonists were not 
completely foreign to us in the early stages of our exposure to the market society. 
What characterised our traditional relationship with our environment was the 
belief first and foremost , that the resources and knowledge was ours to protect, 
and to use for sustenance and survival 
As the focus of intellectual property laws are on ownership and exploitation rights 
rather than duties of protection, the issue must necessarily arise whether the 
protections offered will adequately satisfy the needs of indigenous peoples. 
No DISTINCTION BETWEEN TANGIBLE/ INTANGIBLE 
Finally, in terms of its value and protection, Maori do not differentiate between 
knowledge as an intangible resource and other tangible resources. All are valued 
equally, which in turn requires that all must be equally protected. 
As for other indigenous cultures. the value of both knowledge and n::iturnl 
resources in traditional Maori culture stemmed fundamentally from the need to 
survive: for example, we needed to know where local food sources are, how to 
build shelter, etc. However, Maori culture was traditionally oral - although we 
recorded ideas and communicated through whakairo (carvings), tukutuku (lattice-
work), moko (tattoos) and other forms, we had no written language. And even 
though in this day and age we are able to record ideas and communicate them in 
writing, we still treasure highly those aspects of our oral , intangible, culture which 
make us unique - the ability to kdrero (converse daily in the Maori language), to 
waiata (sing our traditional songs) , to whakaako (educate and transmit 
information) . 
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Western culture , on the other hand, does distinguish between knowledge 
(intangible) and tangible objects. As McNeil! writes:s1 
. .. tangible objects possess an economic value as a natural quality. This value 
being , for example , an expression of the quality of natural scarcity. Knowledge, 
however, being intangible and incapable of exclusive possession isn't be nature 
scarce. Given this , it possesses no natural value. In order for it to acquire value , 
therefore , a scarcity must be art1f1cially (socially) attributed. 
51 Above n 25 , 30. 
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CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property law codifies what is supposedly an acceptance or agreement 
of a particular 'community' about the conditions under which knowledge can 
appropriately be carved out of that 'common' pool of resources for private 
ownership according to "Natural law" Intellectual property law does not define 
the 'community' upon which acceptance and agreement its provisions are based -
i.e. the market-driven society. It is as if the creators of these laws have deemed 
them to be universally applicable. Indeed, they are not: 52 
The [intellectual property] right is based on certain presuppositions and values and 
in practice these are taken to have a universal validity; but to what extent do these 
reflect Maori values? For example, the law works by creating an economic value 1n 
knowledge - by facilitating the commodification of various kinds of objects - but is 
this an acceptable treatment of knowledge for Maori? Also, the law assumes that 
the greatest social utility follows from the creation of individual and primarily 
economic rights in knowledge ... ; how valid is this assumption? Such questions 
are ... obscured to the extent that the law is treated as a given entity, beyond 
question or contest. 
The discussion has shown that in many areas the traditional Maori world view -
and those of other indigenous peoples - seems incompatible with the values and 
beliefs of the philosophical underpinnings of intellectual property law. Indigenous 
peoples, Maori included, exercise a different relationship with their knowledge to 
that which is reflected in intellectual property law: we value our knowledge in ways 
that do not appear to be acknowledged in the protection mechanisms offered 
under that legal regime. 
A 'new-and-improved' system of knowledge protection is required which 
recognises and reflects the differences between both market-driven societal 
concepts and indigenous peoples' concepts about the nature of our relationships 
with knowledge; the difference in our values and beliefs; and our interests which 
need to be met in terms of the protection of that knowledge. This needs to occur 
52 Above n 25, 41-42. 
35 
Ill 
• • • 
• • • • • • • • 
not only for the protection of indigenous knowledge, but also to ensure that the 
indigenous cultures themselves survive intact through to the next century, and 
beyond . 
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